英国东安格利亚论文代写:法律实践的最佳理解

Keywords:英国东安格利亚论文代写:法律实践的最佳理解

通过对现有法律实践的最佳理解，我们仍然可以得出这样的结论:这种实践没有达到理想的效果。以逃亡奴隶为例。当法律要求法官将被俘的奴隶送回南方时，他们该怎么办?为了维护法制的完整，法官应该将奴隶遣送回去，但为了实现正义的目标，法官应该释放奴隶。因此，判决的结果是正直与公正之间的严重冲突。实证主义者会通过区分法律正义和真正的正义来处理这个案件，但在德沃金的理论中，这受到了批评。根据德沃金的理论，这里的相关理想是正直的理想;通过糟糕的法律论证，一个人无法达到这个理想，这是不好的，因为它没有在实际实践中得到最大限度的利用，在实际实践中，这是正直的理想所需要的。所以解释主义产生了一个理想，但它不是所有可能世界中最好的结果，这是我们通常认为的理想。但也许这并不特别重要。我们有完整的理想解，这与正义的理想解不同。有时，公平和效率都需要遵循先例，但诚信是不同的，尽管它也将服务于这两种价值观。然而，正直的理想似乎受到现有做法的限制，而正义的理想则不然。或者，就其本质而言，解释似乎只可能存在于现存的世界中，这表明它根本不是一个理想。要表达这一点，更粗略的说法是，“充分理解”现有的法律做法，不过是适当地描述了股本赤字，也就是说，描述了这些做法离理想状态有多远。
英国东安格利亚论文代写:法律实践的最佳理解
by making best sense of an existing legal practice, we may still conclude that the practice failed the ideal. Take the fugitive slave Acts for instance. [36] What should the judges do when they are legally required to send captured slaves back to the South? In order to maintain the integrity of legal system, the judges should send those slaves back but to achieve the goal of justice, judges should set the slaves free. Hence, the outcome of the judgment represents a serious conflict between integrity and jusitice. A positivist will deal this case by distinguishing legal justice and real justice, but in Dworkin’s theory, this is criticized. According to Dworkin’s theory, the relevant ideal here is the ideal of integrity; it is through bad legal argument that one fails to meet that ideal, and it is bad because it hasn’t made maximal use, in the circumstances of actual practice, what that actual ideal of integrity requires. So interpretivism produces an ideal, but it is not the outcome that would be the best in all possible worlds, which is how we ordinarily think of ideals. But maybe this doesn’t particularly matter. We have the ideal solution in integrity and this differs from the ideal solution in justice. At times both fairness and efficiency require following precedents, but integrity is different, although it will serve both those values as well. Nevertheless, the ideal of integrity appears to be constrained by existing practices in a way that the ideal of justice is not. Or, by its nature, it seems, interpretation is only possible within the existing world, which suggests it is not an ideal at all. A cruder way of putting this point is that ‘making the best sense of’ existing legal practices is no more than adequately characterizing equity deficits, that is to say characterizing how far these practices fall short of the ideal.