英国萨里大学assignment代写 越南战争

Keywords:英国萨里大学assignment代写 越南战争

这种心态促成了我认为的一个主要原因，那就是为什么越南战争在美国介入之前是不可能打赢的，因为越南人民强烈的民族主义情绪和对独立国家的追求。这将在战争期间极大地激发越南人的积极性，并成为一个非常重要的促成因素，解释为什么美国在介入越南战争之前没有很好地了解越南的历史。尽管可以说，美国没有其他选择，只能参与进来，因为他们自己的遏制政策。如果美国想要通过他们的遏制政策保持一致，并相信多米诺骨牌理论，那么除了美国介入越南，就没有其他的方法了。这一政策与越南人的对立性格形成了鲜明的对比，因为双方都有自己的利益。另一个促使越南战争在美国直接介入之前就无法打赢的因素是南越糟糕的领导，以及许多越南人对南越总统吴廷琰(Ngo Dinh Diem)的强烈不满。肯尼迪和约翰逊政府负责经济和农业事务的国务卿乔治·鲍尔(George Ball)引用了外交研究与培训协会(Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training)的一段话。一开始就直截了当地说:“南越在战争中输给了越共。没有人能向你保证，我们能打败越共，甚至能迫使他们按照我们的条件回到谈判桌上，不管我们部署了多少白人外国军队。”“这证明显示甚至美国的政客们不相信美国应该参与越南由于很小的南越政权的支持,又有多少南越已经转向越共代替吴廷琰政权保持忠诚。1964年通过的《东京湾决议》允许约翰逊总统采取任何有助于维护越南和平与安全的措施。“让我们去获得这个权力。“在我看来，这并没有暗示更多。“让我们从国会获得一些权力，”而不是完全采取行动——再说一次，这可能是律师的本能——基于总统的隐含权力，总统的战争权力。
英国萨里大学assignment代写 越南战争
This mindset was what contributed to what I believe is a main reason as to why the Vietnam War was unwinnable before American involvement began, due to the strong nationalist feelings from the Vietnamese and a pursuit for an independent nation. This would heavily motivate the Vietnamese during the war, and be a very important contributing factor as to why the United States did not understand the history of Vietnam well before involvement began. Although it could be argued that the United States had no other choice but to become involved because of their own policy of containment. If the United States wanted to be consistent through their policy of containment and believed in the domino theory, then there would be no other way except for the United States to become involved in Vietnam. This policy and the opposing temperament of the Vietnamese would contrast each other greatly, as both had their own self interests. Another contributing factor as to why the Vietnam War was unwinnable before direct American involvement began would be due to the poor leadership in South Vietnam, and large resentment from many Vietnamese towards the South Vietnamese president, Ngo Dinh Diem. In a quote from the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, quoted by George Ball, who was the Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs under the Kennedy and Johnson administration, “Ball submitted a memo to President Johnson titled “A Compromise Solution for South Vietnam.” It began bluntly: “The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong, or even force them to the conference table on our terms, no matter how many hundred thousand white, foreign US troops we deploy.” This proves to show how even American politicians did not believe that the United States should become involved in Vietnam due to very small support for the South Vietnamese regime, and how many South Vietnamese were already turning to the Viet Cong instead of staying loyal to the Diem regime. When questioned about the Gulf of Tonkin resolution during 1964, which allowed for President Johnson to take any measures to that would help to keep peace and security in Vietnam, George Ball said “I don’t think so. “Let’s go get this authority.” It didn’t seem to me that implied in this was much more than that. “Let’s get some authority from Congress,” rather than act entirely–again, this was perhaps a lawyer’s instinct–on the basis of the implied powers of the President, war powers of the President.”